SYNOPSIS

                                             Henry Pietersma on  Mediation
                                                       March 30, 2001
                                                     Kierkegaard Circle
 

Pietersma  focuses his concern with mediation and Religiousness A by asking how one relates to God while simultaneously maintaining social and political commitments as part of living in the world. This concern arises in connection with Climacus in the Postscript  as to how  a particular human subject becomes a universal subject. The Hegelian doctrine of  mediation does not shed any proper light on the question since, as Climacus understands the doctrine, the  Hegelians assumed that  religion is a theory and therefore its content is intellectual inferior to abstract thought. They succeeded in jumbling up the ideas of state, sociality, community and society such that God could not conceivable show Himself in any other way but in the relative.  In the end the difference, as Pietersma notes, between the absolute and the relative was erased through the Hegelian mediation.

Though critical of Hegel, Climacus nevertheless employs Hegelian ideas of absolute/relative and infinite/finite, and expressions such as “joining together” to introduce an existential  relation in which the relata are independent of one and other. That is,  the absolute is independent of  the relative in the relation of the two. This Climacian move, for Pietersma, means that the attitude of renunciation is to be practiced in the world, and that the unity of the religious life is a matter of tempering acceptance with disassociation. One of the implications of this life orientation is that the ascetic life is not radical enough.

Abrahim H. Khan, Trinity College,
University of Toronto
 

                                                                         Bruce Howes
                                                          Climacus and the Limits of Language
                                                                         December 7, 2001

       On December 30, 1929 in conversation with members of the Vienna Circle, Ludwig Wittgenstein referred fairly directly to what Kierkegaard  in Philosophical Fragments calls the 'ultimate paradox' : ... we do run up against the limits of language.  Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he referred to it in a
fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). (WITTGENSTEIN AND THE VIENNA CIRCLE, p. 68).
The context of these remarks were such that Wittgenstein was clearly pointing to Fragments as a means by which to better understand his own Tractarian views on language's limits. Taking guidance from Wittgenstein's remarks, we will undertake a study of Kierkegaard's critique of language, referring principally, but not exclusively, to Kierkegaard's Climacus works.   BH



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